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Feb., 1952
Standard No. 75 SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT TAX-WHEN A LIEN
Problem: Does a local or special improvement authorized pursu-
ant to statute, ordinance or charter become a lien or encum-
brance before the amount of the special tax therefor has been
ascertained, assessed, and made a lien in accordance with
statute, ordinance or charter?
Answer: No.
Note: The Charter of the City and County of Denver provides
that special taxes shall become liens from the publication of
the assessing ordinance. Charters of other home rule cities
should be examined for pertinent provisions. Insofar as
the state law is concerned, it is provided that a special im-
provement tax becomes a lien when the amount of the assess-
ment is finally determined by the Board of County Commis-
sioners, City Council, or other governing body as the case
may be. (Sections 1 and 8 of Chapter 138, C.S.A. 1935.)
In drafting contracts of sale, attorneys should recognize
the possibility of assessment at some time subsequent to the
transaction, especially if the improvements have been author-'
ized.
COUNTY COURT PRACTICE CHANGED
After January 1, 1952, appellants from Denver municipal
court judgments who wish to demand trial to a jury as a matter
of right must make such demand within 10 days after they docket
their appeal in the county court, according to a court rule promul-
gated by County Judge David Brofman on December 27. The rule
further provides that the clerk shall mail notice of the appeal to
the appellee, who must make demand within 20 days thereafter
if he desires a jury trial.
Issuance of the court rule has been found necessary to avoid
the misunderstandings arising from the fact that Rule 38 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, governing demand for jury trial, pro-
vides that the time limitation on such demand shall be "not later
than 10 days after service of the last pleading", whereas Section
149 of Chapter 46, '35 C. S. A. directs that no written pleadings
may be filed in cases appealed from justice court judgments.
The mailing of the notice of appeal to the appellee should
also prove helpful since heretofore the winning party below had
no inkling of an appeal unless he had meanwhile sought to exe-
cute on his municipal court judgment.
Until the rule becomes familiar to attorneys, copies of it
will be handed to appellants at the time they perfect their appeal
by payment of their county court docket fee, and appellees will
receive a copy by mail along with notice of the appeal. Judge
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Brofman also announced that, with the help of the bar association,
he hopes to have the entire body of County Court rules revised
and distributed within the next three or four months.
These new provisions pertaining to jury trial have been put
into effect by amending existing Rule XV of the Rules of the
County Court to read as follows:
Section 1. The right to jury trial, the demand there-
for, and the waiver thereof, in all civil cases originating
in the county court are governed by Rule 38 of the Colo-
rado Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 2. In cases appealed from the municipal
courts of the City and County of Denver, whether in-
volving civil, criminal, ordinance violation or small claims
matters, and in all other cases where Rule 38 does not
apply because no pleadings are required, demand for
jury trial by the appellant must be made within 10 days
after payment of the county court docket fee, and demand
for jury trial by the appellee must be made within 20
days after notice of such appeal is mailed to the appellee
by the clerk.
Section 3. Failure of a party to make demand as
aforesaid shall constitute waiver by him of trial by jury,
but notwithstanding such waiver the court in its discre-
tion may order a trial by jury of any or all issues.
Section 4. Where a party to an action demands a
jury trial, except by a special jury, such party at the
time of making such demand shall deposit with the clerk
of the court a jury fee in the sum of $5.00. The jury fee
shall be refunded upon demand if no specific setting for
jury trial is made. Even though no jury trial may be
had, if a specific setting for trial by jury is made, the
$5.00 jury fee shall be forfeited.
Section 5. A deposit sufficient to cover the expense
thereof shall be mad by any person requesting a special
jury, and all expenses of such jury shall be taxed as a
part of the costs as provided in Sec. 162, Ch. 46, '35
C. S. A.
RECENT DECISION UNDER RULE XVI-FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
The mailing of notices to litigants or their attorneys under
County Court Rule XVI, providing for dismissal by the court for
failure to prosecute, recently gave rise to a reaffirmation by the
court that once an appellant from a municipal court judgment
has perfected his appeal, the municipal court loses jurisdiction
and all subsequent orders must be entered by the County Court.
Procedendo is therefore limited to those cases in which the appeal
is not perfected. Where the appeal is perfected, the case, not the
appeal, may be dismissed if not prosecuted with due diligence by
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the moving party. Since the so-called "appeal" is actually a trial
de novo, the plaintiff below remains the moving party in the
County Court, regardless of which party filed the appeal.
This decision was rendered when a plaintiff, who had won
judgment below and who had been mailed notice under Rule XVI
for failure to prosecute in the County Court, sought to have the
appeal dismissed and the transcript of judgment sent back to
the justice court by writ of procedendo. Relying on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Flake, 102 Colo. 169,
the court denied plaintiff's motion.
WILLIAM B. MILLER.
APPROVED LAW LISTS
The standing Committee on Law Lists of the American Bar
Association provides the following roster of American law lists,
the publishers of which have received certificates of compliance
for their 1952 editions. The committee will be happy to reply to
inquiries relating to law lists not on this roster.
American Bank Attorneys, Cambridge 38, Mass.
The American Bar, Minneapolis, 4.
American Lawyer's Quarterly, Cleveland 14.
Associated Commercial Attorney's List, New York City 6.
The B. A. Law List, Milwaukee 3.
The Bar Register, Summit, New Jersey.
Best's Recommended Insurance Attorneys, New York City 7.
Campbell's List, Winter Park, Florida.
Clearing House Quarterly, Minneapolis 3.
The Columbia List, New York City 7.
The Commercial Bar, New York City 17.
Corporation and Administrative Lawyers Directory, Chicago 4.
C-R-C Attorney Directory, New York City 7.
Forwarders List of Attorneys, Chicago 3.
The General Bar, New York City 18.
The Insurance Bar, Evanston, Illinois.
International Lawyers Law List, New York City 18.
International Trial Lawyers, Chicago 4.
The Lawyers Directory, Cincinnati.
The Lawyers' List, New York City 3.
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Summit, New Jersey.
Rand McNally List of Bank Recommended Attorneysfi Chicago 5.
Recommended Probate Counsel, Chicago 4.
Sullivan's Probate Directory, Galesburg, Illinois.
The Underwriters List, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Wright-Holmes Law List, New York City 1.
State and Regional Lists published by the Legal Directories Pub-
lishing Company, Los Angeles 24, California.
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